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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Time Limitations On Actions Against
Administrators Or Executors
Chandlee v. Shockley'
The appellant, Clara Chandlee, was injured by an auto
negligently driven by Homer Shockley, who died. on Oc-
tober 8, 1956, from injuries sustained in the accident.
Appellee, who qualified as decedent's administratrix on Oc-
tober 18, 1956, admitted liability to appellant but requested
her to refrain from filing suit, explaining that once the
extent iof her injuries was ascertained, a settlement could
be reached. No settlement having been offered, appellant
filed suit against appellee on June 25, 1957, by virtue of
Article 93, Section 112 of the Code.2 Appellee demurred
on the grounds that the suit had not been filed within the
time limitation of the statute requiring such claims to be
filed within six months from the date of the qualification
of the administratrix. The trial court sustained the demurrer.
In reversing the judgment of the lower court by a 3 to 2
decision, the Court of Appeals held that if the fraudulent
statements of the administratrix had delayed earlier prose-
cution of a ppellant's claim, she was estopped from asserting
the statutory time limitation, and the appellant had the
right to have the case heard on its merits.
In dissenting, Judges Henderson and Homey felt that a
statutory time limitation, contained in a statute creating
the right to sue, constituted a condition precedent to the
plaintiff's right of action, and noncompliance with the
limitation destroyed all rights that the statute could confer.
The earliest time limitations on actions were found in
Roman law which limited the right to recover property.3
Under the common law, the Act of 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, enacted
in 1623 ". . . was the first comprehensive statute to adopt
the modern method of arithmetical computation, instead
of the earlier method of referring to certain well-known
historical events."4 This Act was the forerunner of present
day Statutes of Limitation which "... are such legislative
1219 Md. 493, 150 A. 2d 438 (1959).
18 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 112 provides:
"Executors and administrators ... shall be liable to be sued in any
court of law or equity, in any action (except slander) which might
have been maintained against the deceased . . . provided, however,
that any such action for injuries to the person to be maintainable
against an executor or administrator must be commenced within six
calendar months after the date of the qualification of the executor or
administrator of the testator or intestate."
'Developments-Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177 (1950).
Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud and Statutes of Limitation, 31 Mich. L.
Rev. 591, 597 (1933).
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enactments as prescribe the period's within which actions
may be brought upon certain claims or within which cer-
tain rights may be enforced. . ". ."' Their purpose is to en-
courage prompt ascertainment of legal rights and the sup-
pression of fraud which may be the outgrowth of stale
claims.6 Courts have adopted the principle that, since the
purpose of the Statute of Limitation is to suppress fraud,
they will not allow the Statute to become a means for
perpetrating fraud.7 Therefore, fraud will toll the running
of the Statute in common law actions against one who -has
committed the fraud, yet asserts the Statute as a bar to the
innocent party's claim."
Paralleling the growth of modern Statutes of Limita-
tions was the emergence of many remedies unknown in the
common law. The accuracy of Lord Mansfield's maxim
actio personalis moritur cum persona was challenged by
statutes creating remedies for wrongful death and rights
of actions against decedents' estates. These statutes, creat-
ing new remedies, also created their own, time limitations.
Writers and courts interpreted these limitations as con-
ditions precedent, and noncompliance with the limitation
resulted in the loss of the entire right.9 The leading case is
5 1 Woo, LIMITATIONS OF ACTION (4th ed.) 1, 2.
o 0sbourne v. U. S., 164 F. 2d 767, 769 (2d Cir. 1947).
"All Statutes of Limitations are based on the assumption that one
with a good cause of action will not delay in bringing it for an un-
reasonable perilod of time ..
' First Massachusetts Turnpike v. Field, 3 Mass. 201, 206 (1807):
"If this knowledge is fraudulently concealed from [the plaintiff] by
the defendant, we should violate a sound rule of law, if we per-
mitted the defendant to avail himself of his own fraud."
O Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mason 143, 154 (1st Cir. 1828) :
"Every statute is to be expounded reasonably, so as to surpress,
and not to extend, the mischiefs, it was designed to cure. The statute
of limitations was mainly intended to surpress fraud, by preventing
fraudulent and unjust claims from starting up at great distances of
time, when the evidence might no longer be within the reach of the
other party, by which they could be repelled. It ought not, then, to
be so construed, as to become an instrument to encourage fraud, if It
admits of any other reasonable interpretation, and cases of fraud,
therefore, form an implied exception. . ....
'34 Am. JuR. 16, Limitation of Actions, § 7:
"A statute of limitations should be differentiated from conditions
which are annexed to a right of action created by statute. A statute,
which in itself creates a new liability, gives an action to enforce it
unknown to the common law, and fixes the time within which that
action may be commenced, is not a statute of limitation. It is a statute
of creation, and the commencement of the action within the time it
fixes is an indispensible condition of the liability and of the action
which it permits. The time element is an inherent element of the
right so created, and the limitation of the remedy is a limitation of
the right."
See also State v. Parks, 148 Md. 477, 482, 129 A. 793, 797 (1925) ; Dunni-
gan v. Cobourn, 171 Md. 23, 26, 187 A. 881, 883 (1936).
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The Harrisonburg,"0 in which suit was brought for a wrong-
ful death after a twelve month statutory time limitation
had expired. The Supreme Court, in reversing the Circuit
Court's allowance of the claim, held:
"... The statutes create a new legal liability with
a right to a suit for its enforcement, provided 'suit is
brought within twelve months and not otherwise.
The time within which the suit must be brought oper-
ates as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and
not of the remedy alone. It is a condition attached to
the right to sue at all .... Time has been made an
essence 'of the right, and the right is lost if the time
is disregarded. The liability and the remedy are cre-
ated by the same statute, and the limitations of the
remedy are therefore to be treated as limitations of
the right.""
As a result of decisions following this statutory construc-
tion propounded in The Harrisonburg case, many statutes
expressly include provisions stating that fraud is to toll
the running of statutory time limitation. The Maryland
Workmen's Compensation statute provides:
"Filing after fraud or estoppel - When it shall
be established that failure to file claim by an injured
employee or his dependents was induced or occasioned
by fraud, or by facts and circumstances amounting to
an estoppel, claim shall be filed within one year from
the time of the discovery 'of the fraud or within one
year from the time when the facts and circumstances
amounting to an estoppel cease to operate and not
afterwards."'"
Also courts have created implied exceptions for enemy
aliens during time of war," and for American citizens who
were prisoners of the enemy. 4 These cases were the basis
for the opinion of the court in Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast
Line Railway Co.5 This case is heavily relied upon by the
10119 U. S. 199 (1886).
Ibid., 214 (1886). Many decisions citing this case fail to give weight to
the closing statement in the opinion:
"No question arises in this case as to the power of a court of admiralty
to allow an equitable excuse for delay in suing, because no excuse of
any kind has been shown." Ibid.
8 MD. CODM, (1957) Art. 101, § 39.
lHangar v. Abbott, 6 Wallace, 532 (U. S. 1867).
14 Supra, n. 6.178 F. 2d 253, 15 A.LR. 2d 491, cert. den. 339 U. S.. 919 (1949).
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majority opinion in the principal case. In that case, a seven-
teen year old boy was injured by the defendant and the
defendant's agent induced the boy to wait until he reached
the age of twenty-one to bring his claim in order that his
injuries might be more accurately ascertained. When suit
was brought, defendant claimed plaintiff was barred be-
cause the Federal Employers' Liability Act 16 contained
a three year limitation. The defense contended this consti-
tuted a condition precedent to plaintiff's suit as the Federal
Employers' Liability Act created a right unknown in the
common law. The court rejected this defense and held
that the defendant's fraud estopped him from asserting
the statutory time limitation. This view was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Termi-
M, 1'7 decided shortly after the decision in the principal case
was rendered. In holding that fraud by the defendant
stopped the running of a statutory time limitation, the
Supreme Court added: "... we need look no further than
the maxim that no man may take advantage of his own
wrong.'
'8
The Maryland Court of Appeals has also distinguished
procedural and substantive remedies and has held that
non-compliance with a statutory time limitation on a
remedy created by the legislature results in the destruction
of the entire right.' But closer in point to the principal
case is Bogart v. Willis,2 ° in which the plaintiff brought his
claim after the statutory limitation had elapsed. There the
Court held a letter from the administrator of the estate,
admitting the claim, before the period had elapsed tolled
the statute.
"Any other construction would permit a defendant
to play fast and loose, and claim the benefits of the
statute while at the same time leading the plaintiff
to believe that he proposed to pay the claim. "21
The dissent in the principal case is based upon the
grounds that the Court cannot "properly write in exceptions
to the condition imposed by the Legislature, on general
"45 U.S.C.A. (1954) § 56, provides:
"No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced
within three years from the day the cause of action accrued."
"359 U. S. 231 (1959).
"Ibid., 232.
"State v. 'Parks and Dunnigan v. Cobourn, supra, n. 9.
o158 Md. 393, 148 A. 585 (1930).
Ibid., 407.
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equitable grounds.22 The cases cited in the dissent refer
to an excerpt from Chief Judge Marshall's opinion in
McIver v. Ragan:23
"Wherever the situation of a party was such as, in
the opinion of the legislature, to furnish a motive for
excepting him from the operation of the law, the legis-
lature has made the exception. It would be going far,
for this court to add to those exceptions .... If this
difficulty be produced by the legislative power, the
same power might provide a remedy; but courts can-
not, on that account, insert in the statute of limita-
tions, an exception which the statute does not con-
tain., 24
The dissent distinguishes the Osborne21 and Hanger26 cases
as being decided on the principle of international law that
during war, "no court was available to which jurisdiction
could be ascribed."27
The reasoning of Bogart v. Willis28 and Scarborough v.
Atlantic Coast Line29 seems more compelling and more in
point as to the effect of fraud. While an express exception
concerning fraud would have made the Court's decision
easier, the writer believes that the Court has properly de-
cided the principal case. The decision seems in accord with
the modern trend of decisions, which give no effect, insofar
as the question of fraud waiving the time limitation, to the
distinction between common law Statutes of Limitation
and time limitations on statutory remedies unknown to
the common law. Statutory rights and limitations must be
considered in the light of the body of the law of which they
are to become a part. As common law time limitations are
tolled by fraud, no adequate reason can be presented for
applying a different interpretation as to statutory time
limitations.
IRVIN N. CAPLAN
'2219 Md. 493, 503, 150 A. 438 (1959).
232 Wheat. 25 (U. S. 1816).
Ibid., 29, 30.
21 Osbourne v. United States, 164 F. 2d 767, 769 (2d Cir. 1947), see
supra, n. 6.
,Hangar v. Abbott, 6 Wallace, 532 (U. S. 1867), see supra, n. 13.
7 Supra, n. 22, 505.
28 Supra, n. 20.
178 F. 2d 253, 15 A.L.R. 2d 491, cert. den. 339 U. S. 919 (1949).
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